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Abstract—Nowadays, Vehicular Ad hoc Networks 
(VANETs) are popularly known as they can reduce traffic and 
road accidents. These networks need several security 
requirements, such as anonymity, data authentication, 
confidentiality, traceability and cancellation of offending users, 
unlinkability, integrity, undeniability and access control. 
Authentication is one of the most important security 
requirements in these networks. So many authentication 
schemes have been proposed up to now. One of the well-known 
techniques to provide users authentication in these networks is 
the authentication based on the smartcard (ASC). In this paper, 
we propose an ASC scheme that not only provides necessary 
security requirements such as anonymity, traceability and 
unlinkability in the VANETs but also is more efficient than the 
other schemes in the literatures.  
Keywords— VANET, ASC schemes, privacy-preserving, 
Authentication, Tamper Proof Devices (TPD).  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Many road accidents can occur because of the ignorance 
of the driver about road conditions [1].  VANETs are applied 
for communication between vehicles and Road side Units 
(RSUs) and improving road safety. These networks consist of 
Trusted Authority (TA), Road Side Unit (RSU), and On-
Board Unit (OBU). There are V2V and V2R communications 
in these networks, and according to [2], there is a secure 
channel between the RSUs and the TA. These 
communications are shown in Fig. 1. In this figure, suppose 
that the OBU1 and the OBU2 are moving at high speeds, given 
that these cars are not in sync with each other, an accident is 
more likely to happen. The VANET can prevent this accident. 
In these networks, each OBU acts as a node and sends 
information to the nearest OBU. In these networks, important 
security requirements are authentication, confidentiality, 
privacy and anonymity, traceability and cancellation of 
offending users, integrity, authenticity, undeniability, access 
control, public verifiability and unlinkability. 
Authentication of the sender and data are two important 
security requirements in VANETs, because the source of the 
transmitted data should be verified to make sure the validity 
of the received data. Proposed authentication schemes for 
these networks can be divided into 4 categories. 1) Symmetric 
encryption-based authentication schemes [3-4] that do not 
meet the requirement of public verifiability and undeniability, 
2) Asymmetric encryption-based authentication schemes that 
are divided into PKI and ID-based schemes [5-6], 
Fig. 1. Elements of vehicular ad-hoc networks. 
 
3) Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) based schemes [7] 
and 4) Blockchain-based schemes [8]. Among these schemes, 
ID-based schemes are more efficient and secure. One of the 
well-known ID-based schemes is the Conditional Privacy-
Preserving Authentication (CPPA) [9-10] that provides 
necessary security requirements in VANETs. However, if the 
infiltration to one of the TPD occurs, this scheme cannot 
provide several security requirements such as privacy-
preserving and unlinkability.  
Other well-known ID-based schemes are the 
Authentication based on Smart Card (ASC) schemes [2, 
11,12]. Authors in [2] and [12] proposed ASC schemes that 
provide many security requirements in VANETs; however, 
they don’t provide unlinkability in a RSU’s range, and the TA 
cannot prevent offending IDs registration in the registration 
phase. Also, the presented scheme in [2] doesn’t provide the 
pass change phase. Authors in [11] proposed another scheme 
that can prevent offending IDs because of using the 
registration list, which is not an efficient scheme. 
In this paper, a regular ASC scheme will be proposed that 
not only provides security requirements such as anonymity, 
traceability and unlinkability, but also is more efficient than 
other ASC related works.  
The paper is organized as follows: we review typical ASC 
schemes in Section II. Then in Section III, we explain the 
weakness of the ASC schemes. Section IV presents our 
proposed scheme, and section V evaluates the security and 
performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude 
the paper in Section VI. 
 
Fig. 2. User authentication phase of [2]. 
 
II. REVIEW OF TYPICAL ASC SCHEMES IN VANETS 
Typical ASC schemes are ID-based, which support V-2-
V and V-2-R communications. These schemes, consists of 
three parts as follows:  
 Trusted Authority (TA): This is the honest 
center of the network. TA produces primary 
parameters stored in OBUs and smart cards. 
Also, it participates in authenticates of OBUs 
entering at a RSU’s range, and establish a 
session key for authenticated OBUs.  
 Road Side Unit (RSU): RSU authenticates 
OBUs, which enter in its range with the help of 
TA, communicates wirelessly with the OBUs, 
and transfers the session keys determined by 
TA.  It is assumed that there is a secure channel 
between RSUs and TA [2].   
 On-Board Unit (OBU): Each vehicle is 
equipped with an OBU for secure 
communication with the around vehicles using 
a session key. 
    These schemes usually consist of five phases: the user 
registration phase where users register with the TA; the user 
login phase where vehicle owner with valid smart card logs 
in to a vehicle; the user authentication phase where vehicle 
efforts to establish a secure connection with the TA; the data 
authentication phase where authenticated datagrams are 
sent; the password change phase where the vehicular owner 
efforts to change his/her passwords [2].  
 Due to the desirable properties of [2] in the following, we 
review the proposed scheme in [2]. This protocol focused on 
the user registration phase, the user login phase and the user 
authentication phase.  
In [2] it has been assumed that each vehicular user Vi 
register with the TA once and the registration phase done 
through a secure channel without any adversary interference. 
In addition, an adversary will not be allowed to register with 
the TA using one or more identities. 
The TA determines the system parameters as follows: Fp 
as a finite field of prime order p and generator g, a uniformly 
random element x of  Zp and y=𝑔𝑥  mode p as the master 
private and public keys, Also let s be the server’s secret and 
H0 and H1 are two secure one-way hash functions. 
Vehicular user Vi picks its unique identifier IDVi and 
transmits it to the TA. After getting the registration request, 
the TA first checks that the identifier has not been used before. 
Then it calculates 𝑘 = 𝐻0(𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 ⊕ 𝑠)  and delivers a smart 
card containing {𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖  ||𝑘|| 𝑔|| 𝑝|| 𝑦|| 𝐻0||𝐻1}  to vehicle 
owner Vi. To provide user login phase Vi inserts the smart 
card in its vehicle. Throughout this procedure, the 
communication is supposed authentic.  
Whenever Vi desires to establish a secure communication 
with the TA through the nearest RSU, it runs the subsequent 
steps to get a session key. You can see the details in Fig. 2.  
Step 1: The user Vi inserts its smart card in the vehicle’s card 
reader and after getting back  𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦  selects a uniformly 
random integer α, and the timestamp T, then calculates the 
subsequent expressions: 
 .iD g mod p

 
(1) 
 .iE y mod p

 
(2) 
 0 .i Vi iAID ID H E   
(3) 
 0  , .iDIDV H k E  
(4) 
0 . , ), ,(i i i iCV H AID DIDV E T  
(5) 
At the end, Vi forwards {Di, AIDi, DIDV, CVi, T} to the RSU. 
Step 2: Whenever the RSU gets a login request message from 
a car, it checks the timestamp. If it is valid, it concatenates its 
identity to the message and sends it to the TA. 
Step 3: TA first checks the timestamp, if it was valid, it 
attempts to verify the received message through the 
subsequent relations:  
( )  .xi iE D mod p
                                                          (6) 
0 0( .( ) )i ik H AID H E s
   
 
(7) 
0 , , , .( )i i i iCV H AID DIDV E T
 
 
(8) 
The request would be rejected, if 𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑉 ≠ 𝐻0(𝑘
∗||𝐸𝑖
∗)  or 
𝐶𝑉𝑖
∗ ≠ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 . If not, TA accepts this request and produce a 
random number β, and calculates the following values: 
 .iG g mod p
                                                             (9)  
 1  .S iK H D mod p  
      (10) 
 
 
Fig. 3. User authentication phase of the proposed protocol.
 
1  ( , ), .i i iC H D mod p E k
  
 
(11) 
Then TA forwards {AIDi, Ci, Gi} to the nearest RSU of the 
same vehicle through a secure channel.  Then RSU broadcast 
this message.  
Step 4: If a broadcasted message contains AIDi then OBUi 
computes the following expressions: 
*
1  ), ,( .i i iC H G mod p E k
        (12) 
 1  S iK H G mod p   
      (13) 
If 𝐶𝑖
∗ = 𝐶𝑖 then it sets the 𝐾𝑆
∗ as the session key. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ASC PROTOCOLS 
In the previous section, we have review one of the well-
known ASC schemes presented in [2]. It satisfies many 
security requirements such as authentication, confidentiality, 
privacy and anonymity, traceability, integrity, authenticity 
and undeniability and according to figure 4 this scheme is 
efficient among ASC schemes. Also, this scheme has been 
focused on the user registration phase, the user login phase and 
the user authentication phase and to provide other phases of 
ASC schemes authors of [2] referred to [12]. Authors in [12] 
proposed a hash chain based protocol for data authentication 
phase that not provides unlinkability in one RSU’s range. 
Therefore, the proposed scheme in [2] cannot supply the 
unlinkability property for messages that transmit in one RSU's 
range.  Also, however, [2] mentioned that the password 
changing phase is one of the ASC scheme phases but authors 
of [2] don’t use PW and therefore, in [2] there is no solution 
to change the password. Another remark is that in [2] and [12], 
due to not employing a registration list, TA cannot prevent 
offending IDs registered in the registration phase but, in [11], 
TA can delete offending IDs from its registration list and don’t 
let them be authenticated in the user authentication phase. 
According to the outlined analysis, we want to propose a 
new ASC scheme that not only provides mentioned necessary 
security requirements such as authentication, confidentiality, 
privacy and anonymity, traceability, integrity, authenticity 
and undeniability, unlinkability and preventing offender users 
in the VANETs but also is more efficient than the other ASC 
schemes in the literatures. 
 
 
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
The proposed scheme is an ID-based scheme using the 
registration list. The architecture of this scheme is similar to 
the scheme proposed in section 2. The phases are as follows:      
 User registration phase 
In this phase, a user with a valid ID registers with the TA. If 
we assume that h is a secure one-way hash function. In this 
phase, the TA with a server master key (S) chooses IDr and 
PWr for the r-th vehicle of the network, then it calculates kr= 
h(IDr+S), Zr=kr+h(PWr) and h(k,1) for each vehicle. Then, the 
TA saves IDr and h(kr,0), the OBUr saves IDr, Kr, PWr, and Zr, 
and the smart card saves IDr and PWr. 
 User login phase 
In this phase, the vehicle owner is authenticated by OBU. First 
the vehicle owner inputs his smart card in the OBUr. Then 
OBUr computes h(PWr) and checks equation Zr=kr+h(PWr) to 
be established. If the values are not matched, the smart card 
returns a fail. 
 User Authentication Phase 
In this phase, the OBU authenticates with TA, and then TA 
sends a session key to the OBU. Also, according to the 
assumptions in [2], we assume that there is a secure channel 
between the TA and the RSUs. Also, after the first 
authentication, the TA saves h(kr,2) instead of h(kr,1). In the 
next session, we use h(kr,2) for the authentication process. In 
the same way, we use h(kr,i) for the i-th session.  
Step1: OBU calculates AIDi and UACi as follows: 
 .,i rAID h k i  (14) 
  , , , .i r r iUAC h k h k i T  (15) 
then sends  , ,i i iAID T UAC to the nearest RSU.  
Step2: Then, the RSU sends  , ,i i iAID T UAC to the TA via a 
secure channel. The TA checks whether Ti is valid, and also 
checks if the AIDi exists in its registration list. If so, then the 
TA calculates:     * , , ,r irUAC h h ID S h k i T  , and checks 
the equation UAC =UAC*. If UAC is valid this message is 
authenticated , then the TA computes 
'
sk and ai as follows: 
' ( )
rs k s
k ENC K
 
(16) 
 , ,i i sra h k T k  
(17) 
Then the TA sends /{ , }, ,  ,i s s i rAI K a IDD k to the RSU via a 
secure channel.  
Step3: RSU saves {ID, AIDi, ks} in its authentication list (Lauth) 
to use it in the data authentication phase, then it sends 
/{ },  ,i s iAID k a to the OBUr. 
Step4: OBUr first checks whether  * , , sri ia h k T k  exist if 
so OBUr can calculate /( )
rs k s
K DEC k (with symmetric 
encryption). The details of this phase are illustrated in Fig 3. 
 Data authentication phase 
We use the proposed idea of [11] for this phase Because of 
providing unlinkability requirement in RSU’s range. If a 
vehicle in travel wants to issue traffic information, 
the OBU sends {T2, m, σm} to the RSU and to other vehicles, 
where σm = h(T2,m,Ks). 
RSU receives {T2, m, σm} then checks whether timestamp T2 
is the latest. Then, the RSU finds out the item {Ks} in its 
authentication list (Lauth), which satisfies σm = h (T2, m, Ks). 
If such an item is found in Lauth, the massage is valid; 
otherwise, if the equation is not satisfied in Lauth, the message 
is invalid. After message authentication of RSU, the RSU 
saves the {T2, m, IDr} in the message authentication list of 
RSU (Lm), then notification message is produced by the RSU, 
consisting of the bloom filter. This filter stores the hash value 
of the valid traffic messages and their timestamps [13]. This 
notification message is encrypted with the private key SKRSU 
of the RSU, which can prevent an attacker from modifying or 
forging the notification message. 
After sending the notification massage by the RSU, the OBUs 
around this RSU receive this notification message. Then, this 
OBUs decrypt this message using the public key of the RSU. 
If one of these OBUs wants to verify the validity of the 
message {T5, m, σm} sent by the other OBUs, the OBU will 
compute h(T5,m) and check whether this value is in the 
notification message. If this value exists in the notification 
message, the received message is valid, otherwise, the OBU 
waits to the next notification message from the OBU.  
 Password changing phase 
In this phase, the vehicle owner that feels the password has 
been exposed, changes his password saved in his smart card. 
In this phase, the OBUr owner inserts his IDr and his old PWr. 
The OBU verifies these imported values. If the values are 
matched, then the vehicle owner inserts his IDr and his new 
PWrnew. The OBUr computes the new Zrnew= kr+h(PWrnew) and 
saves new parameters in his memory. 
V. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF NEW SCHEME 
A. Security analysis and security proofs 
We compare the security requirements of this proposed 
scheme, and also prove these security requirements: 
Table. 1. Security comparison among the different schemes. 
                        scheme  
Security 
 requirement  
[2] [11] [12] 
proposed 
scheme  
ID preserving + + + + 
Traceability + + + + 
Unlinkability - + - + 
Pass change phase - + + + 
Prevent offender IDs - + - + 
Efficiency - - - + 
 
1) Identity privacy-preserving: The OBUs only send the 
pseudo-identity (AID) when it reaches to the range of the 
RSU. Pseudo-identity is calculated by the equation 
 ,i rAID h k i  and   , , ,i r r iUAC h k h k i T . According 
to the hash function properties, these values are random. 
Therefore, no polynomial-time malicious can gain the real 
identity of the OBU through the pseudo-identity AID. Hence, 
our proposed scheme has met the requirements of the identity 
privacy-preservation. 
2) Traceability and Prevention of offender IDs: When 
the RSU encounters malicious messages, it can search the 
item {T2, m, IDr} in its message list Lm, and then sends { IDr } 
to the TA. The TA can search the item < IDr > in its 
registration list. Then the TA can prevent this ID from 
sending a message by invalidating the offender IDs in the user 
authentication phase. 
3) Non-repudiation: If the OBU wants to deny its 
message, the RSU can find the {T2, m, IDr} according to the 
timestamp T2 in the message list Lm quickly, which contains 
the real identity of the OBU and its registration time. Thus, 
our scheme has met the requirements of non-repudiation, and 
the OBUs cannot deny their messages. 
4) Unlinkability: According to the preimage resistant 
property of the hash function,  ,i rAID h k i , 
 1 , 1i rAID h k i    and   , , ,i r r iUAC h k h k i T ,
  1 1, , 1 ,i r r iUAC h k h k i T   are entirely different in the 
user authentication phase. Also, in the data authentication 
phase, the message format in the new proposed scheme is {T2, 
m, σm}, where σm = h(T2,m,ks). Therefore, due to the 
properties of the hash function of two messages, the 
adversary cannot define if the two given messages are sent by 
the same OBUi using the message content, which achieves 
the unlinkability requirement. 
5) Modification of passwords: A vehicle’s owner can 
modify the passwords anywhere and anytime, whenever 
he/she considers the passwords are not secure, and its details 
are brought in password changing phase of proposed scheme. 
 These comparisons are illustrated in Table 1. 
B. Efficiency analysis and compare it with other schemes 
ASC schemes consist of five phases, and each phase has 
computation costs and communication burden. Also, 
according to [14], the RSUs have power and bandwidth 
limitations. Also, they are close to each other, and we need a 
new authentication phase in each RSU’s range. Therefore, 
low computation cost and communication burden in the user 
authentication phase is important. We define Te=Modular 
exponentiation time, Tm=Multiplication of points on ECC 
Table. 2. Efficiency comparison in the authentication phase of different 
schemes on each side of the VANET architecture. 
      over 
Head   
OBU RSU TA 
[2] 3𝑇𝑒 + 5𝑇ℎ + 
𝑇 = 14.43𝑚𝑠 
0 3𝑇𝑒 + 6𝑇ℎ
+ 2𝑇
= 14.46𝑚𝑠 
[11] 3𝑇𝑚 + 7𝑇ℎ
+ 3𝑇 = 60𝑚𝑠 
𝑇𝑚 + 4𝑇ℎ
+ 𝑇
= 20.35𝑚𝑠 
2𝑇𝑚 + 9𝑇ℎ
+ 5𝑇
= 40.73𝑚𝑠 
[12] 𝑇𝑒 + 8𝑇ℎ + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐
+ 𝑇
= 5.12𝑚𝑠 
𝑇ℎ + 𝑇  
= 0.03𝑚𝑠 
𝑇𝑒 + 8𝑇ℎ
+ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐 + 2𝑇
= 5.12𝑚𝑠 
proposed 
scheme 
3𝑇ℎ + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐  
= 0.21𝑚𝑠 
0 4𝑇ℎ + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐
= 0.24𝑚𝑠 
 
time (secp256r1), Th=Hash time (SHA-256), Tenc=symmetric 
encryption/decryption time and T=XOR function time. 
In [2], the time of this operations using a smartphone 
(iPhone 6s) as the test platform and the specific parameters 
with system iOS 10.11, CPU Apple A9 C M9 coprocessor C 
up to 2.1 GHz, RAM 2GB, has been calculated as follows: 
Te=4.76ms, Tm=20.23ms, Th=0.03ms, Tenc=0.12ms,           
and  T  is negligible. 
Accordingly, Table 2 shows the computational complexity 
and implementation timing of the new proposed scheme and 
several ASC-based schemes in the user authentication phase. 
The results of Table 2 and figure 4 show low computational 
complexity and time of implementation of the new proposed 
scheme compared to the previous schemes.  
Therefore, the new proposed scheme has a low computation 
and communication overhead compared to the other ASC 
schemes.  
 
Figure. 4. Efficiency comparison in the authentication phase of different 
schemes. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, with regards to the vulnerability and inefficiency 
of ASC-based schemes, we have made some modifications to 
this schemes and improved the efficiency of the ASC 
schemes, while maintaining the desired features of the ASC 
schemes. Besides, the proposed scheme is resistant to many of 
the vulnerabilities of the previous schemes, furthermore 
according to figure 4 and table 2 the proposed scheme is more 
efficient than the similar works. 
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